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The Social Worker's Privilege, Victim's
Rights, and Contextualized Truth
by
MYRNA

S. RAEDER*

Rather than critique Professor Mueller's paper, with which I
generally agree, I intend to use it as a jumping off point to raise some
issues that have not yet been articulated about the connection between politics and privilege. I too was unsurprised about Jaffee's'
recognition of a psychotherapist privilege, but am, like the other
speakers, concerned about how the Supreme Court reached this result, why it expanded the privilege to encompass social workers, and
what this portends.
The first question that struck me about Jaffee was, "How can the
common law tradition work in creating new privileges as instructed
by Federal Rule of Evidence 501, when we no longer really have any
common law of privilege?" Accretion is at best illusory in a world
where states enact statutory privileges by responding to political
pressure with no thought to Wigmore's classic formulation,2 and
where the federal system has cut off its best avenue for experimentation by making the common law of privileges irrelevant in diversity
cases The Eighth Circuit is the most likely source for evolving standards concerning the psychotherapist privilege. Due to its Indian
Country jurisdiction, it sees most of the federal child abuse, battered
women, and rape cases. Yet even here, there have not been many
* Professor of Law, Southwestern University School of Law.
1. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996).
2. 8 JoHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (3d ed. 1940). Wigmore suggested
that privileges should only be recognized when: (1) The communication must originate in
a confidence that they will not be disclosed; (2) This element of confidentiality must be
essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties; (3)
The relationmust be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously
fostered; and (4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communication must be greaterthan the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of the
litigation. Id.
3.

See FED. R. EVID. 501.

[991]
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decisions discussing this issue.4 Before Jaffee, relatively few federal
cases addressed the existence of the privilege, though predictably
some of the decisions that did involved alleged civil rights violations.5
Take a hard look at the parties in these cases who are likely to
seek psychological help: "victims." It is not an exaggeration to suggest that one of the major political forces of our era, the Victims'
Rights Movement, is ultimately responsible for defining the scope of
the federal privilege, just as it had been in the states. How can I advance this iconoclastic claim? Professor Mueller aptly observed that
privilege is the one place we do not pretend our rules are value-free.
Instead, we admit that privileges are really substantive because they
regulate out-of-court conduct.6 Thus, if the Court relies on state
privilege law to inform the federal common law principles, it is obvious that the pressure to expand victim oriented privileges will be
great, because the Victims' Rights Movement has been incredibly
successful in obtaining all manner of favorable state legislation, including privileges. Yet, in Jaffee, the Supreme Court said with no
hint of irony that "[b]ecause state legislatures are fully aware of the
need to protect the integrity of the fact-finding functions of their
courts, the existence of a consensus among the States indicates that
'reason and experience' support recognition of the [psychotherapist]
privilege." 7
Now that this broad federal privilege has been blessed by the
Supreme Court, Professor Mueller would let state law define its contours, 8 a proposition with which I disagree. This is a federal function
that Congress explicitly left to the courts in Rule 501. States vary too
much in their privilege definitions for it to be wise to rely on naked
political power to prescribe its boundaries. Courts are at least one
step removed from the rough and tumble world of legislative politics,
and federal judges with lifetime tenure are less susceptible to pres-

4. See, e.g., United States v. Bercier, 848 F.2d 917. 920 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding that
statements made by defendant to his treating physician were properly admitted, as the
physician-patient privilege was not recognized in federal criminal proceedings).
5. See, e.g., Mines v. City of Philadelphia, 158 F.R.D. 337 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (finding in
a civil rights action that a protective order was appropriate where plaintiffs sought discovery of psychotherapist's records concerning officer who allegedly used excessive
force).
6. Christopher B. Mueller, The Federal Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege After Jaffee: Truth and Other Values in a TherapeuticAge, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 945 (1998).

7.

116 S. Ct. at 1930.

8.

See Mueller, supra note 6, at 947.
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sure than state judges who stand for re-election. On the other hand, I
agree with Professor Mueller that expectations of confidentiality are
typically grounded in state privilege law, since local law is relied upon
by members of the community in regulating their out of court conduct, not the fortuity that a later action will be filed in federal, rather
than state, court and address federal issues.
One solution might be to create a hybrid privilege that would
rely on state law if it exists, and if not, fall back on federal common
law.' Yet even here, as the Supreme Court noted, if both state and
federal claims are joined, the trial court would have to decide which
law to apply when they are not identical, an issue on which there is
not full agreement." Most judges apply the federal privilege law
when there is a conflict. It is unclear, however, whether this is really
a matter of the Supremacy Clause, or rather simply a byproduct of
the fact that federal court has been more hostile to expansive privileges than the states have been. Thus, federal judges may pick federal law because it provides no privilege, thereby resulting in the admissibility of the evidence. Ironically, Jaffee's social worker privilege
is likely to be much more expansive than state law. As such, lower
courts may be more comfortable applying the state privilege, directly
or as part of a hybrid approach, when the two conflict, in order to restrict the application of this amorphous privilege. But to completely
abandon what little is left of the common law tradition of privilege to
definition by the states appears to be in derogation of the federal
court's role of ensuring integrity of federal trials. Nor is there any
indication that Congress would approve such abrogation of the federal rule.
The deeper challenge posed by Jaffee is predicting its significance. The expansion of the privilege to a social worker acting as a
psychotherapist was ultimately surprising because it was so swift and
signaled a true paradigm shift: the common law is now truly common-the law of the people. Those who look at privilege from a
power perspective as preserving the prerogative of the elite have to
9. This type of formulation was proposed by the American Bar Association's
Criminal Justice Section's Committee on Federal Rules of Evidence and Procedure for
civil cases. American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section's Committee on Rules for
Criminal Procedure and Evidence, ProposedPrivilegeRules, at 4 (Final Draft 1994) (on
file with author).
10. See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1931 n.15.
11. See 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTCE AND PROCEDURE §
5434 (1980).
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be taken aback (or possibly elated) by the potentially vast undefined
social worker privilege. Twenty years ago, Representative Hungate
derided the quest for privilege by social workers by mentioning them
in the same breadth as piano tuners. 2 Yet, the Supreme Court now
tells us that common law principles justify granting them a privilege.
Times have changed, and as Funk v. United States so aptly foresaw,
"[t]he public policy of one generation may not, under changed conditions, be the public policy of another." 3
What has changed in that twenty years, a blink of the eye in
common law terms? May I suggest Princess Diana could inform us
on this topic as well. 4 Society from top to bottom is in a fit of self
Twelve step programs
discovery, betterment and realization.
abound, and the mental health mode appears to follow one of two extremes. Either people tell the world their most intimate problems a
la Princess Diana or they tell the mental health provider and depend
on their secrets being kept because of the perceived stigma, shame,
embarrassment or disgrace associated with seeing a psychologist or
with the revelations themselves. Public approval of this search for
self understanding and solace permeates throughout our culture, with
even the Supreme Court assuming that "[t]he mental health of our
citizenry, no less than its physical health, is a public good of transcendent importance."' 5
In a society that encourages working out problems with the help
of professionals, why should the victims among us be denied their
right to obtain help? Society also recognizes that the victims are not
only the rich who patronize psychiatrists, or the middle class who visit
psychotherapists, but the masses who can barely afford any help or
are sent with public funds to public as well as private social workers.
The People's Princess would understand this people's privilege. And
in its haste to be egalitarian, the Supreme Court gave nary a thought
12. Representative Hungate told the Senate Committee that "when you open this
up, the social workers and the piano tuners want a privilege." Edward J. Imwinkelried.
An Hegelian Approach to Privileges Under FederalRule of Evidence 501: The Restrictive
Thesis, the Expansive Antithesis, and the Contextual Synthesis, 73 NEB. L. REV. 511, 534
(1994) (citing FederalRules of Evidence: Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the Senate Conznt.
on the Judiciary,93d Cong. 6 (1974)).
13. 290 U.S. 371, 381 (1933).
14. References to the Princess' recent tragic death had been previously made by a
few speakers, in the context of how the media shaped public opinion and thereby had an
effect on expectations of "truth" at trial. See, e.g., Johannes F. Nijboer, Vision, Abstraction, and Socio-Economnic Reality, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 387 (1998).
15. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1929 (emphasis added).
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to the significant difference in qualifications required for licensing
social workers as compared to psychotherapists and psychiatrists.
Indeed, the Court did not even limit the privilege to the approximately 21,500 clinical social workers certified by the American Board
of Examiners. 6
But one did not need to read the content of the many amicus
briefs filed in Jaffee to predict this result. It was obvious from a quick
reading of their statements of interest. The psychiatrists weighed in
with 42,000 members,17 the psychologists with 135,000 members and
affiliates, 8 but the social workers had 155,000 members. 9 Moreover,
the National Association of Social Workers' ("NASW") brief indicated that in 1990 the number of social workers in mental health organizations and general hospital psychiatric services was more than
the combined number of psychiatrists and psychotherapists.' The
practical reality is that because insurance may only pay the lower
rates for social workers, the middle class, as well as the poor, might
only have access to treatment with social workers.
Yet, I don't view Jaffee as simply an equal access issue. Personally, I think this was a victims' rights issue. It may be instructive to
look at who the victim was in Jaffee. It was not the person shot, but
the female police officer who shot him as he wielded his butcher
knife. It is noteworthy that the National Association of Police Organizations ("NAPO"), representing 185,000 law enforcement officers, also weighed in with an amicus brief2 that articulated the great
trauma that officers encounter when they are faced with shooting
someone. Moreover, the Supreme Court recognized that "[p]olice
officers engaged in the dangerous and difficult tasks associated with
protecting the safety of our communities not only confront the risk of
physical harm but also face stressful circumstances that may give rise
to anxiety, depression, fear, or anger. '
16. See Brief for the National Association of Social Workers et. al. as Amici Curiae,
Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996) (No. 95-266) [hereinafter NASW Brief].
17. See Brief of the American Psychiatric Association and the American Academy of
Psychiatry and the Law as Amici Curiae, Jaffee v. Redmond, 113 S. Ct. 1923 (1996) (No.
95-266).
18. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Psychological Association, Jaffee v.
Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996) (No. 95-266).
19. See NASW Brief, supranote 16.
20. See id
21. See Brief of Amicus Curiae National Association of Police Organizations, Inc.,
Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996) (No. 95-266).
22- Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1929 n.10.
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Thus, what I see happening is that the victim, be it adult or child,
who seeks help to deal with physically or sexually or mentally abusive
conduct caused by another, is perceived as an innocent whose privacy
and confidentiality should be protected. This is so not because we
presume the perpetrator committed a criminal offense, but because
that person's conduct caused the need for the mental health consultation. In other words, the communication is privileged because the
perpetrator's conduct requires a forfeiture of any right to the confidential communication.' To those who would argue that this rationale cannot be employed in (typically criminal) cases in which the
identity of the perpetrator is in dispute without assuming the defendant is the assailant, the response is that this is no different than the
numerous other evidentiary rulings on preliminary facts which are
based on a lower standard of proof than that required to convict the
defendant.2 4
But I detect that something more significant is happening, something that goes to the essence of this conference-the question of
truth versus its rivals. I see privilege being viewed in this context as
an ally of the truth, not as an adversary. Why? Because the public at
large, like victims, does not believe that privilege hides the truth regarding the victim's credibility. Rather, privilege is regarded as enhancing the truth-finding ability of the jury. Why? Because they
think that the lawyer's role is to find and exploit minor inconsistencies, embarrass the victim, and cloud or even distort the truth by unfairly attacking the witness' credibility. Moreover, many believe the
context in which the privileged statements are made color their
meaning. NAPO's brief echoes Kim Scheppele's findings about victims:' police officers who kill may blame themselves as well as the
people they kill, and may go through a number of phases before they
23. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) (forfeiture by wrongdoing).
24. See, e.g., Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990) (affirming introduction of
prior act which resulted in acquittal).
25. Kim Lane Scheppele, Just the Facts Ma'am: Sexualized Violence, Evidentiary
Habits, and the Revision of Truth, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 123, 126-27 (1992).
The very fact of delay or change is used as evidence that the delayed or changed
stories cannot possibly be true. But abused women frequently have exactly this

response: they repress what happened; they cannot speak; they hesitate, waver,
and procrastinate; they hope the abuse will go away; they cover up for their
abusers: they try harder to be "good girls"; and they take the blame for the
abuse upon themselves. Such actions produce delayed or altered stories over
time, which are then disbelieved for the very reason that they have been revised.

Id. (footnotes omitted).
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can assimilate what truly happened. The fact that Redmond could
not recall pulling the trigger until the completion of fifty therapy sessions, and her belief that she had a better recollection of the incident
after therapy than a few hours after the shooting, 6 is consistent with
the view that therapy permitted a redefinition of truth-a contextualized truth. Such a truth would no doubt fit well in the holistic storytelling approach to trial practice, aided by syndrome and social science evidence to teach the jury about the reality of the victim's life.
Why is such context needed? Because the victim's reality may not be
the same as that of the jurors, nor may their values be shared or even
understood by the jurors without such information. In a world where
the powerful speak in a common language, victims and those who in
the past were (or even now are) outsiders currently demand that their
stories be told in their own voices. Thus, the relationship between
truth and privilege appears to be in the eyes of the beholder, and
telling the jury secrets from a tormented heart may not be perceived
as assisting the search for truth. As Spinoza once said, "He who
would distinguish the true from the false must have an adequate idea
of what is true and what is false."'27
Yet, with this said, I am uncomfortable with the lack of definition given this social worker privilege and the undoubted pressure to
extend it even further down the line to minimally trained rape and
battered women's counselors who volunteer their time on hot lines
and front line shelters.' And in criminal cases, what becomes of the
defendant's right to confront witnesses? Professor Mueller suggests
that Ritchie2 9 is honored in the breach. ° At a minimum, courts
should be more forthright in acknowledging, like the hearsay rules
now do, that withholding such information is based on a forfeiture by
misconduct," rather than creating untenable justifications based on
privilege theory.
But what happens when the defendant wants to claim the benefits of the therapeutic model? Professor Mueller posits that we
should want all people to attain mental health, not simply good peo26. Petitioner's Brief at 36, Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996) (No. 95-266).
27.

II SPINOZA, THEOLOGICAL-POLrITcAL TREATISE 42 (1670).

28. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1035.8 (sexual assault victim-counselor privilege),
1037.5 (domestic violence victim-counselor privilege) (West 1997); see also United States
v. Lowe, 948 F. Supp. 97 (D. Mass. 1996) (finding federal rape counselor privilege).
29. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
30. See Mueller, supranote 6, at 964-65.
31. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) (forfeiture by wrongdoing).
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ple. However, the common law is inevitably shaped by culture, and
today, society is driven by concern with victims' rights. Child abuse
reporting statutes clearly override the psychotherapist privilege in a
number of states on the theory that we must protect those who cannot protect themselves. If the states now control the evolution of
common law privileges, we will see the continuation of the trend that
favors victims' rights at the expense of defendant's rights until the
day may arrive when the "evolving common law" protects only
"good" people. Is this the ultimate utilitarian victory: truth being
served by a lopsided interpretation of privilege that protect victims,
while exempting alleged perpetrators? Whether this result actually
serves truth or its rivals may depend on one's views about the relative
roles of context and doctrine at trial. Reaching a balance that ensures that context supplements, but does not supplant or distort, the
truth finding function at trial is not an easy task,32 regardless of the
evidentiary issue in question. Courts, however, must take care not to
confuse evidentiary policy with political power when reaching those
determinations.

32. See Marianne Wesson, Historical Truth, Narrative Truth, and Expert Testimony.
60 WASH. L. REV. 331 (1985) (discussing how psychiatrists shape the truth when they testify, and stating that they are not equipped to detect what really happened in the world
(historical truth)).

